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New Anderson papers tell warning by CIA chief on India's intent

By Morton Kondracke and Thomas B. Ross

Sun-Times Bureau

WASHINGTON — Central Intelligence Agency director Richard M. Helms told the White House that India did not intend to stop fighting with Pakistan until Pakistani air and armored defenses were destroyed, a new set of Anderson papers has revealed.

Presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger responded that "elimination of Pak armored and air forces would make the Paks defenseless. It would turn West Pakistan into a client state . . . a vassal."

The newest set of secret documents released by columnist Jack Anderson tend to support claims by Kissinger that fear of an Indian assault on West Pakistan was the motive behind the "tilt" in U.S. policy toward Pakistan in the war.

The latest document, minutes of a meeting of the National Security Council's Washington Special Action Group on Dec. 8, is the first of the Anderson papers to give any indication of U.S. motives during the crisis.

Amid speculation that President Nixon acted against India out of personal pique or to protect relations with China, Kissinger has been putting out word that the CIA offered "conclusive proof" of an Indian intention to demolish Pakistani defenses and dismember Pakistan.

The Anderson document says Helms told the WSAG, "It is reported that prior to terminating present hostilities, Mrs. Gandhi (Indira Gandhi, Indian prime minister) intends to attempt to eliminate Pakistan's armor and air force capabilities."

Kissinger and Helms agreed that India intended to seize Azad Kashmir, that is, the portion of the disputed northern territory in Kashmir in Pakistani hands. The documents do not make fully clear whether the Indians were intent on yet further "dismemberment" of India.

Kissinger said that "if the Indians smash the Pak air force and the armored forces we would have a deliberate Indian attempt to force the disintegration (sic) of Pakistan."

A dissent was registered by Joseph J. Sisco, assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asia affairs.

Sisco reportedly said that "if the situation were to evolve as Dr. Kissinger had indicated, then, of course, there was a serious risk to the viability of West Pakistan."

"Mr. Sisco doubted, however, that the Indians had this as their objective. He indicated that Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh told Ambassador (Kenneth) Keating that India had no intention of taking any Pak territory."

"Mr. Sisco said it must also be kept in mind that Kashmir is really dis-

be witnessing is a situation wherein a country (India), equipped and supported by the Soviets, may be turning half of Pakistan into an impotent state and the other half into a vassal. We must consider what other countries may be thinking of our action."

Kissinger said: "We are not trying to be evenhanded. There can be no doubt what the President wants. The President does not want to be evenhanded. The President believes that India is the attacker. We are trying to get across the idea that India has jeopardized relations with the United States."

The day before the WSAG meeting was held, Kissinger told reporters at a backgrounder that "there have been some comments that the administration is anti-Indian. This is totally inaccurate."

The WSAG discussed possible ways, in Kissinger's words, to "turn the screw" in the situation, apparently settling on none.

There is no mention in the document of the plan that Kissinger now says was successful — a forceful message to the Soviet Union insisting that Russia stop her ally, India, from attacking West Pakistan.

According to the documents, it was King Hussein of Jordan who initiated an offer to provide eight U.S.-built jet fighters to Pakistan, another Moslem country. Previous installments of the Anderson papers implied that the United States had thought up the plan.

Kissinger, according to the document, "asked how we could get Jordan into a holding pattern to allow the President time to consider the issue." Representatives of both the State and Defense departments urged abandonment of the idea.



RICHARD HELMS

HENRY A. KISSINGER

SECRET U.S. DOCUMENTS

India Aim Seen to Crush Pakistan

Exclusive to The Times from
the Chicago Sun-Times

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The newest set of secret documents released by columnist Jack Anderson tend to support current claims by Kissinger that fear of an Indian assault on West Pakistan was the motive behind the "tilt" in U.S. policy toward Pakistan in the recently concluded war.

First Indication

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against India out of personal pique or to protect relations with China, Kissinger has been putting out word that the CIA offered "conclusive proof" of an Indian intention to demolish Pakistani defenses and dismember Pakistan.

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Threat to Kashmir

Kissinger and Helms agreed that India intended to seize Azad Kashmir, the portion of the disputed northern territory in Kashmir in Pakistani hands. The documents do not make fully clear whether it was thought the Indians were intent on still further "dismemberment" of Pakistan.

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secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs.

Sisco reportedly said that "if the situation were to evolve as Dr. Kissinger had indicated, then, of course, there was a serious risk to the viability of West Pakistan."

Expressed Doubt

"Mr. Sisco doubted, however, that the Indians had this as their objective. He indicated that Foreign Minister (Swaran) Singh told Ambassador (Kenneth) Keating that India had no intention of taking any Pak territory."

"Mr. Sisco said it must also be kept in mind that Kashmir is really disputed territory."

After further discussion, Kissinger said that "what we may be witnessing is a situation wherein a country (India), equipped and supported by the Soviets, may be turning half of Pakistan into an impotent state and the other half into a vassal. We must consider what other countries may be thinking of our action."

Kissinger said that "we are not trying to be even-handed. There can be no doubt what the President wants. The President does

not want to be even-handed. The President believes that India is the attacker. We are trying to get across the idea that India has jeopardized relations with the United States."

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Secret Papers: Mrs. Gandhi Said She Had Kremlin Pledge

Washington, Jan. 14 (Special)—Columnist Jack Anderson released today the text of a summary of another White House meeting on the India-Pakistan war. In it, a senior administration official was quoted as attributing to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi a statement that the Soviet Union had promised to take "appropriate counteraction" if China intervened in the war.

The summary of the Dec. 8 meeting of key administration officials includes the widely quoted remarks by presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger that President Nixon "does not want to be even-handed" in his position on the war because he "believes that India is the attacker."

Stamped "Secret"

The summary was one of four that Anderson obtained and used as a basis for his columns earlier this month detailing the administration's attempt to cope with the India-Pakistan crisis.

The documents received by Anderson were stamped "secret sensitive." Anderson published his stories on the premise of the public's right to know.

Kissinger charged that Anderson quoted him out of context. Anderson then made public the texts of the summaries of the meetings, which were conducted by the Washington Special Action Group of the National Security Council.

Attended by 20

Before today, Anderson released the texts of the group's meetings Dec. 3, Dec. 4 and Dec. 6.

The Dec. 8 meeting was attended by 20 representatives of such agencies as the CIA, Agency for International Development, Joint Chiefs of Staff, State Department and Defense Department, according to the summary.

Among the main speakers at the 70-minute meeting were Kissinger; CIA Director Richard M. Helms; David Packard, who resigned Dec. 14 as deputy secretary of defense; Assistant Secretary of State Joseph J. Sisco; U. Alexis Johnson, undersecretary of state, and Maurice Williams, deputy administrator of AID.

Seven-Page Summary

The India-Pakistan war broke out Dec. 3 and ended Dec. 17. Packard announced his resignation Dec. 11, three days after he attended the meeting.

The following are excerpts from the seven-page confidential summary that Anderson made public:

"Mr. Helms then stated that earlier he had omitted mentioning that Mme. Gandhi, when referring to China, expressed the hope that there would be no Chinese intervention in the West.



Jack Anderson
Releases another text

"She said that the Soviets had cautioned her that the Chinese might rattle the sword in Ladakh but that the Soviets have promise to take appropriate counteraction if this should occur."

Mr. Helms indicate that there was no Chinese buildup at this time, but, nevertheless, even without a buildup, they could make "motions and rattle the sword."

(Ladakh, a remote part of Kashmir in India, juts between China's Sinkiang province and Tibet. The Chinese overran the area in 1951 and, without the Indians finding out about it for a year, built a road from Sinkiang to Tibet across Ladakh's Aksai Chin Plateau in an effort to protect its Tibetan supply line. The Chinese last made a show of force in Ladakh in November 1965.)

On the Kissinger remark, the text reads as follows:

"Dr. Kissinger said that we are not trying to be even-handed. There can be no doubt what the President wants. The President does not want to be even-handed."

"The President believes that India is the attacker. We are trying to get across the idea that India has jeopardized relations with the United States."

"Dr. Kissinger said that we cannot afford to ease India's state of mind. 'The lady' is cold-blooded and tough and will not turn into a Soviet satellite merely because of pique. We should not ease her mind. He invited anyone who objected to this approach to take his case to the President. Ambassador Kenneth Keating, he suggested, is offering enough reassurance on his own."

"Next Turn of Screw"

The summary also shows Kissinger's deep interest in U.S. aid to India and Pakistan. Pakistan's aid was cut off before the war; most of India's after it began. Having been assured that very little aid was getting through to India, "Dr. Kissinger inquired what the next turn of the screw might be."

At another point, when discussing the 1972 AID budget, "Dr. Kissinger stated that cur-

rent orders are not to put anything into the budget for aid to India. It was not to be leaded that AID had put money in the budget for India only to have the 'wicked' White House take it out."

The document recorded Kissinger's interest in a suggestion that the U.S. might get military supplies to Pakistan by routing them through Jordan.

Question of F-104s

"Mr. Packard explained that we could not authorize the Jordanians to do anything that the USG (United States government) could not do," the document read. "If the USG could not give the F-104s (American F-104 jets) to Pakistan, we could not allow Jordan to do so."

"If a third country had material that the USG did not have, that was one thing, but we could not allow Jordan to transfer the 104s unless we make a finding that the Paks, themselves, were eligible to purchase them from us directly."

"Dr. Kissinger suggested that perhaps we never really analyzed what the real danger was when we were turning off the arms of Pakistan."

STATINTL

Pressures on Aides

The pressures on Nixon's advisers to come up with some basis for Nixon's apparent support for Pakistan was seen in the following exchange:

"Ambassador Johnson said that we must examine the possible effects that additional supplies for Pakistan might have. It could be that eight F-104s might not make any difference once the real war in the West starts. They could be considered only as a token. If, in fact, we were to move in West Pakistan we would be in a new ballgame."

"Ambassador Johnson said that one possibility would be our rely to Foreign Minister (Indian Foreign Minister Swaran) Singh, in which we could acknowledge the Indian pledge that they do not have territorial designs. He also stated we must also consider the fact that the Paks may themselves by trying to take Kashmir."

"After discussing various possible commitments to both Pakistan and India, Mr. Packard stated that the overriding consideration is the practical problem of either doing something effective or doing nothing."

"If you don't win, don't get involved."

"If we were to attempt something it would have to be with a certainty that it would affect the outcome. Let's not get in if we are going to lose. Find out some way to stay out."